Kants religious cosmopolitanism is Janus-faced:i to scillatesb etween ad ynamic understanding of religious progress in world historyfocusing on arational understanding of moral faith on the one hand and adefence of the Christian religion as the best path to reach the vocationofthe human species on the other. AccordingtoKant, the Christian churches are historically indispensableinthe evolution of the moralpredispositions and religious convictions of the human species, and in the process of cultivating acritically disciplined moral religion. This essay highlights the tension between ar ational understandingo fm oral faith and an embeddeda pproach that winds up with an apology of Christianity.
Introduction
"Once human naturehas attained to its full destiny and highest possible perfection, that will be the kingdom of God on earth, and inner conscience,justice and equity will then hold sway,rather than the power of authority" (Collins 27, p. 471) . In recent years,n umerous and excellent interpretations of Kants cosmopolitanism have been published. Many focus on his legal cosmopolitanism,especially on cosmopolitanright;others deal with his moralcosmopolitanism, especially the idea of an ethical or moral commonwealth (for introductions see Kleingeld 2012 and Cavallar 2015) .T omyknowledge,nopublication has so far dealt with whatI call Kants religious cosmopolitanism. Thequote from the Collins lecture with the emphasis on the destiny or vocation of the species,its possible perfection, on inner conscience and "the kingdom of God on earth" highlights this usually neglected type of cosmopolitanism, perhaps typicalo fm any Enlightenment thinkers (see Louden2007, pp.15-25) . Thepresent essay tries to fill this gap in Kantscholarship.Iwill argue that Kants cosmopolitanism is Janus-faced:itoscillatesbetween ad ynamic understanding of religious progress in world history focusing on a rational understandingo fm oral faith on the one hand and ad efence of the Christian religion as thebestpath to reach the vocationofthe human specieson the other. According to Kant, the Christianc hurchesa re historically indispensable in the evolution of the moral predispositions and religious convictions of the human species,and in the process of cultivating acritically disciplined moral religion. This tension between ar ational understandingo fm oral faith and an embedded approach that winds up with an apology of Christianity is highlighted in this essay.
Cosmopolitanism is the belief or the theory that all humans, regardless of race, gender,historicalfaith or political affiliation belong to,orshould belongto, one single community,and that this global community should be enhanced and promoted.K ant claimst hat humans reach their cosmopolitan vocation (Bestimmung)ifthey cultivate their dispositions,especially (but not only) their moral one,and promote the highest good, the combinationofvirtue and happiness.Kant makes the following distinctions (this follows Langthaler 2014:II, pp.93-147 and Cavallar 2015, pp.21-48 ): 1. Thehighest good in the writings on politics and historyisthe highest political good, namely aglobal juridical condition (Rechtszustand)which approximates world peace (cf.MM6,p.354 f.). 2. Thee stablishment of ag lobal ethicalc ommunity is the "highestm oral (sittliche)good" (Religion 6, p. 97) . This is Kants moral cosmopolitanism. Kant calls the duty to promote this highest good as amember of the cosmopolitan moralcommunity or "union […] of well-disposed human beings"(Religion 6, p. 98) aduty "sui generis […] of the human race toward itself", since the highest good is agood "common to all" (ibid.,p.97). 3. Thehighest good proper coincideswith the transcendent kingdom of God,the "supersensible( intelligible) world" (Theodicy 8, p. 264) or the "Kingdom of Heaven" (Religion 6, p. 134; c f. End 8, .A sK ant puts it in The Conflict of Faculties," the human being must be destined for two entirely different worlds: for the realm of sense and understandinga nd so for this terrestrial world, but also for another world, which we do not know -amoral realm" ( Conflict 7, p. 70; c f. 28 p. 301) . This is Kants religious cosmopolitanism.
In the Critique of Practical Reason,K ant distinguishes between the "highest original good", that is,Gods existence,and the "highest derived good (the best world)" (KpV 5, p. 125) . Kants argument throughout his works is that our honest attempts to promote the latter, which coincides with no.2or the "highest moral good", leadstothe moralinterest in the presupposition of no.3,the highest good proper, which implies Gods existence.T he transition from no.2to no.3is the point of contention among Kant scholars and one focus of this essay( see the analysis below). Ia rgue that Kant developsi nt he ReligionW ithin the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793) aform of religious cosmopolitanism that claimstoberootedinthe Christian tradition, interpreted according to the standards of Kants own moral religion. Religious cosmopolitanism is the view that believers of different faiths, denominations or religious communitiesare members,orshould be members,of one single community.K antian religious cosmopolitanism is the view that all human beings who have developed am oral disposition, implicitly or explicitly understand theirenvisioned good life-conduct as authentic religious serviceand have ordained their moraldisposition to the ethical commonwealth, are members of asingle community of believers.What Kant calls philosophical chiliasm -the idea of alegal community encompassing the whole world at the end of history -is complementedb yt heological chiliasm -t he idea of ag lobalm oral commonwealth beyond history.Philosophicalchiliasm is political and includes the highest political good, namely perpetual peace and aworld-republic;theological chiliasm "awaits for the completed moral improvement of the human race" (Religion 6, p. 34). Agents who cultivate their moral disposition and aim at virtue consider themselves "the chosen citizens of adivine (ethical) state" (Religion 6, p. 136). For Kant, this concept is cosmopolitan in the sense that it is based on morality understood as auniversal,apriori capacity of rational agents,and that any human being is capable of understanding and following the moral law.Consequently,any human who strivesf or moral perfection is ap rospective member of this divine state,provided that they develop amoral faiththat is the rational consequence of an impartial analysis of the human condition of finite beings with am oral disposition.
Thediscussion proceeds as follows.Section 2tries to reconstruct Kants religious cosmopolitanism. My approachd iffers from standard interpretations by emphasising the personal dimension of Kants moral theism. Kants religious cosmopolitanism revolvesaround the idea of atranscendent "unconditioned totality" (KpV 5, p. 108), with humans being obliged to promote thistotality (which coincides with the highest good proper) by forming visible churches,combating the social consequences of radical evil,c ultivating their moral predispositions (Anlagen)a nd thus approaching the idea of ac osmopolitan "invisible church". Them ain reason whym oral educations hould be complemented by religious formation is personal in the sense that the whole of ones life is at stake,ones selfunderstanding and ones "life-conduct". Religious formationaims at fightingoff moraldespairand sorrow (melancholy, Kummer)and intends to boost our willingness to steadfastly pursue the highest good as the goal of our moral volition. This personal understandingisalso the background of the idea of aKingdom of heaven or God or the "church invisible", destined to encompass" the entire humanr ace", since "the concept of an ethical community always refers to the ideal of atotality of human beings" (Religion 6, p. 96).
Section 3c laimst hat Kants religious cosmopolitanism is dynamic. Kants teleological and reflectiveinterpretation of history and his sketch of the history of the church (Kirchengeschichte)o utline ad evelopment from the moral predisposition (Anlage)i nh umans to the triumpho ft he invisiblec hurch. Manifest religious practice started with an aberration, namely,with paganism.The vocation of the human species is to conceptualize,establish and cultivate pure religion or moralfaith. In Kants narrative of the history of the church, Judaismisthe neg-ative foil to make Christianity shine. One of the latters distinct advantagesover the Jewish faith is its cosmopolitan nature, namely the attempt to found au niversal church. Kant distinguished sharply between the teachings of Christ accordingt ot he New Te stament on the one hand and whatl ater generations of theologians and church leaders madeout of them. Theprocess of reform reaches a climax in the Age of Enlightenment.
In Section4,Iargue that Kant deliberately went beyond the idea of rational or naturalr eligion widespread in the Enlightenment. Ia mg oing to discuss two relatedK antian claims.T he first one is that religious cosmopolitanism (as developedinthe previous section) has to be embedded, that is,has to be rooted in and take as its starting point an ecclesiastical faith with its statutory laws.Iargue that this claim is plausible. Kants second claim is that only the Christian churches can offer this startingpoint. Idonot find all his arguments convincing. Kant holds that the biblical stories are "valid and binding practically,for the whole world and at all times" so that anyone "can recognizeh is dutyi ni t" (Religion 6, p. 83). However, Kant reaches this cosmopolitan conclusion only after he has interpreted these stories according to his hermeneutical approach.
Kants Religious Cosmopolitanism
When at the end of the Lectures on pedagogy,Kant reflects on religious education or formation(Bildung), he asserts that "one must not begin with theology" (LP 9, p. 494). Moral formation that started with theological concepts would in all likelihood foster heteronomy,with fear of Gods anger and attempts to get divine rewards as the main incentives.The educational advice is based on Kants doctrine that "on its own behalf morality in no way needs religion" (Religion 6, p. 3), because of the autonomy of practicalreason. In the same lectures,Kant also holds that "to all morality there belongs religion" (LP 9, p. 494) . This mirrors his philosophyo freligion and the central claim that morality "inevitably leads to religion" (Religion6 ,p .6 ), ac laim that has been the focus of philosophical controversy up to the present.
Kants argument in favouro fr eligious formation as complementing moral education can be reconstructed in the following way.Kant came to realise that in order to steadfastly commitoneself to amoral life and to cultivate virtue,certain religious beliefs -such as the viability of the ethical commonwealth -and symbolic representation were required. Thecore of the argument is that the unconditional moral law sets the moral agent in opposition to nature and the world as it is,and thus exposesher to the possibility of moral despair. This in turnthreatens the cultivation of amoral character, the willingness to promote the realization of the highestg ood, and the commitmentt oam oral life in general. It was Kants claim that proper moral education turns the student to the inner core of her own reason,and that,since all humanbeings share identicalrational structuresapriori, this in turn leads to the idea of universality and thustothe idea of juridical, moral and religious cosmopolitanism.
Moral education shouldb ec omplementedb yr eligious formation sincet he latter aims at fighting off moral despair,once the moral agent has becomeaware of the split betweenthe world as it ought to be and world as it is,and her realization that fulfilling the moral command may result in undermining ones own pursuit of happiness in the world. In itself,this does not undermine the possibilityofmoral endeavours, but it undermines its likelihood. Kant claims that in order for the moral law to be binding on us,wehave to be sure that the highest good and the moral world are at least possible (from the point of view of theoretical reason). I am only obligedtoobey the categorical imperative if its aim (the moral world or the kingdom of ends) is not beyond reach.Thus,according to Kant, the decision to choose moral good ratherthan evil leads to anotherdecision with the form of an either/or, eitherrational faith in God or the moral despair of the atheist faced with the possiblef utility of her endeavour (cf.K dU 5, p. 452;B eiser2 006, p. 616 f. ; Caswell 2006, p. 208; Munzel 1999, p. 212; Wood 1970, p. 160) .Kant does not deny that atheists can acquiregood moral dispositions,but he sees aproblemintheir steadfastness and unwavering commitment to morality.T he righteous atheist Spinoza might strive unselfishly for amorally betterworld here on earth,and this is just what his own practical reason demandshim to do.However,hewill be faced with his limited powers to change the world for the better, he will have to acknowledge that nature is indifferent to morality,and he will meetother humans who are evil and underminehis well-intentioned efforts.Hemight lead alife that is nasty,miserable and short, and has to face the prospect of an absurdend, namely being thrown back "into the abyssofthe purposeless chaos of matter" (cf.KdU 5, p. 452).
AccordingtoKant, this attitude or belief-system of the righteous atheist is not in the "interest of reason" and the "interest of humanity" (KrVA, A 798; cf. KdU 5, p. 455) . It might undermineour willingness to steadfastly pursue the highestg ood as the goal of our moral volition, and our virtue," the moral strength of ah uman beings will in fulfilling his duty" (MM 6, p. 405, emphasis deleted) . Thei dea of God as the omnipotent being which combines the two distinct elements of the highest good, namely virtue and proportionate happiness, "meetsour natural need, whichwould otherwise be ahindrancetomoralresolve" (Religion 6, p. 5). Our resolve would be hindered if we assumed that, thoughwe knew how amoral world should look like,westill held that it was impossible.Inall likelihood, our resolve would melt away (see also KpV 5, p. 126;C ollins2 7, pp.317-320 andKants assessment of atheism in Denis 2003, pp.203-208) .
This line of thinking parallels Kants reflectionsi nt he philosophy of history, which is also an antidote against the sorrow (melancholy, Kummer)w hich can overcome the morally-minded observerw hen confronted with the miseries,i njustices and horrors of world history.This sorrow is dangerous because it can soon developi nto "moral corruption", the loss of courage, and the pessimistic con-viction that human endeavours are pointlessa nd devoid of any meaning( Beginning8 ,p .1 20 f. ;f or ad iscussion see Goldman 2012; L angthaler 2014, p. I, pp.251-433; P ollmann 2011) . Ideally,the philosophy of history teaches us to be contentw ith nature (or divine providence) and motivates us not to desist from workingtowards the realization of the highest good (cf.Beginning 8, p. 123). Most importantly, it replaces "disgust" and "despair" when lookinga tt he past and presentwith modest hope (Idea 8, p. 30) . Thedifference between the philosophy of history and the philosophy of religion is that the former is at eleological reflection on the possibility of the highest political good, whereas the philosophy of religion primarily deals with the highestgood proper, with the possibility of moral progress and the kingdom of God. Therefore,political and religious cosmopolitanismsdonot coincide.
Thep roblem Kant tackles here is one of virtue or the "strengtho fs oul" (Anthropology 7, p. 293) and of ones conduct of life.Kants practical philosophy leads only to the threshold of moral faith. This faith is subjective insofar as it requires "moralcognition of oneself" (MM 6, p. 441), honesty,choice and commitment, which can only be done by the individual agent (cf.KdU 5, p. 450 f. ;see for instance the discussion in Dörflinger 2004, pp.220-223; S tangneth 2000, pp.208-210; W immer1 990, pp.77-88; W ood, 1970, pp.153-187, 252 f. and in particular Langthaler 2015, p. II, pp.16-235) . Icall this dimension personal:Kant explicitly uses the first person singular whenwriting about moralfaith.Itisnot some abstract philosophical thoughtbut apersonal confession and conviction in the first place:"the belief in aGod and another world is so interwoven with my moral disposition that Iaminaslittle danger of ever surrenderingthe former as I am worried that the latter can ever be torn away from me" (KrV B857;cf. Collins 27, pp.319-322 where he uses the collective "we" in one of his lectures). Moral faith is part of ones own self-understanding.Moralfaith involves achoice,but this choice is not arbitrary, blind, or irrational;it is based on practical concepts and can be communicated -atleastindirectly -toother rational beings (KrV Bp.848 f. ; Kuehn 1985, p. 167; P asternack 2011, pp.294-296 and 314) . Thed imension is personal in the sense that the whole of ones existence is at stake, ones selfunderstanding,ones "life-conduct" (Lebenswandel;Religion 6, p. 170 and 175), not merely somemaxims or ones inner disposition.
This personal understandingisalso the background of the idea of aKingdomof heaven or God or the "church invisible", sincei ti si nterpreted by Kant "as a symbolic representation aimed merely at stimulating greater hope and courage and effort in achievingi t" (Religion 6, p. 134). Thep hrase "symbolic representation" points at Kants concept of "symbolism" or "schematism by analogy". "In the ascent from the sensible to the supersensible,wecan indeed schematize (renderaconcept comprehensible througha nalogy with something in the senses)" (Religion 6, p. 65 note;see also KdU 5, pp.351-354 and Chignell 2011, p. 114 f. ,1 24;W ood 2011, p. 140 f.). Thes ymbolic or analogical content for the rational idea of amoral world is the Kingdom of God.Its features or "requisites" correspond with the four categories of quantity,q uality,r elation and modality (Religion 6, p. 101 f. ;cf. Cheneval 2002, pp.467-472; Louden 2000, pp.125-132; Sala 2004; W ood 1970, pp.189-200; W ood 2008, pp.259-269; W ood 2011) .
Thecategory of quantity is the most important one.The principles of the ethical commonwealth should be universal and "lead to universal union in as ingle church"(Religion6,p.101). It is destined to encompass "the entire humanrace", is distinct from apolitical community,which governsthe external actions of humans (ibid.,p.96), and is a"universal republic basedonthe laws of virtue" (ibid., p. 98). Furthermore,i tc oincides with the invisiblec hurch, and is the moral vocation (Bestimmung)ofthe human race (ibid.,p.100 f. ; Conflict 7, and 15, p. 608 f.) . Thee thicalc ommonwealth has to be global in reach since each ethicalcommunity -aparticular ecclesiastical faith,for instance -isjust a"particular society" whichr emains in as tate of naturei nr elation to others. Thus it would not overcomeits imperfections or the constant threat of conflict and strife within its own congregation or with others (Religion 6, p. 96, Conflict 7, p. 50). In his "Lectures on Metaphysics", Kant refers to a" spiritual community" and a "community of the blessed (Seligen)" not yet accessiblet ou sb ecause of our sensuous intuition. However,all humans who have become"righteous" and developedtheir good disposition, no matter if they live in India or in Arabia, have joined this community "alreadyinthis world"(LM 28, p. 299). Its members are "citizens of ad ivines tate" that is global in reach. According to Kants hermeneutical interpretation of the New Te stament, Jesus wanted the disciples to be united in this kingdom "with others of like mind, and if possible with the whole human race" (Religion 6, p. 134).
Who qualifies as amember in the invisiblechurch?The invisible church "encompasses all right-thinking peoplewithin itself and alone,invirtue of its essential composition, can be the true church universal" (Religion 6, p. 176). Theoriginal refers to "alle Wohldenkende";t he context suggests that these are people who have understood that true religious service consists in good life-conduct (ibid.). What about those who are agnostics or atheists,h ave no concept of religious service, but have become virtuous in the Kantian sense?Elsewhere Kant argues that people all over the world are Christians "in potential",p rovided that they have gone through theirmoral "rebirth" or "revolution" or conversion (Religion 6, p. 47;Collins 27, p. 464), acquired amoral disposition and (therefore) promote the highest good. Kants example is Socrates (cf.23, p. 440). In another passage, this even includes Spinoza, Kants example of avirtuous atheist who,according to Kant, implicitly assumes Gods existence "in praktischer Absicht" even when he denies cosmotheology(cf. KdU 5, p. 452; 18, p. 542; 27, p. 312; LM28, p. 299 and above) . This suggests that Kanthas abroad understanding of membership in the invisible church:members do not necessarily have to subscribetothe core articles of faith of naturalreligion (freedom,immortality,God) to qualify. Someofthem do;others might be called "anonymous" members.However, in the middle of the paragraph quoted from above,K ant refers to those who "place their service of God …i nt he disposition to good life-conduct" (Religion 6, p. 176), and this is described as ac onscious act of religious service,n ot as something implicitly or anonymously.O nt he other hand, in the passage Kant contrast truer eligious service with ad eficiento rw rongu nderstanding whichh ec alls "counterfeit service" (Religion 6, p. 175 f.), so it does not exclude the possibility of anonymous members.Iconclude that Kant should be interpretedasoffering an understanding of membership in the invisible church that is comprehensive, not exclusive.Inthe next section, Io ffer as ketch of Kantsn arrative of the coming of the invisible church,which Ithink supportsmyinterpretation that Kant favoured acomprehensiveversion.
Dynamic Religious Cosmopolitanism:from the Moral Predisposition to the Triumph of the Invisible Church
My startingpoint is Kants theory of predispositions (Anlagen) (Louden 2014) : first,K ant sometimes compareshumanswith animals or even plants,pointing out that they are equipped with certain germs (Keime), and they are determined to develop in acertain way. In this context, Bestimmung can be rendereda s" determination", since it is "merely amatterofpropersowing and planting that these germs develop" (LP 9, p. 445). Here humans are part of the naturalworld subject to its laws.The second meaning relates Bestimmung to the concept of indetermination, as ahuman being, even from the perspective of empirical anthropology, is capable of reflection, deliberation and the freedom of choice,t hat is," choosing for himself aw ay of living and not being boundtoasingleone" (Anfang 8, p. 112). This corresponds with the level of the cultivation of skilfulness and prudence.Finally,asbeings with moralpredispositions,weare bestimmt to cultivate or develop them. "The human being shall make himself better, cultivate himself,a nd, if he is evil, bring forth morality in himself" (LP 9, p. 446).T his is the level of moralf reedom and of cosmopolitanism, and our Bestimmung is av ocationo racalling:h umans "feel destined [or called] by nature to [develop] …i nto a cosmopolitan society (cosmopolitismus)that is constantly threatened by disunion but generally progresses towardacoalition" (Anthropology 7, p. 331). Ther egulative principle of acos-mopolitan society comes in two versions.O ne is ap olitical union of the whole human species based on just and coercive laws that are mutual and "come from themselves"(ibid.). Theother one is the moral commonwealth which promotes virtue and proportionate happiness and is developedi nt he ReligionW ithin the Boundaries of Mere Reason (cf.6,pp. 96-102).
Religious faith (which coincideswith natural religion here)isseen as distinct from the Anlagen,b ut as al ogical consequence of the moral predisposition, properly understood. As Kant puts it, "faith in af uture life […] automatically imposes itself upon everyoneb yv irtue of the universal moralp redisposition in human nature"(Religion6,p.126, my emphasis). This is an echo of Kants central -a nd contested -c laim in the Religion and elsewhere that "morality […] inevitably leads to religion" (Religion 6, p. 6, my emphasis). Natural religion is defined as moral faith in immortality and the afterlife,indivine retribution and justice,based on the awareness that both are absentinthe world we know.Itgrows out of the moralpredisposition, but has to be brought under concepts.
Kantsinterpretationofhistory is teleological and reflective.Naturehas purposes,a nd "one can assume as ap rinciple that nature wants every creature to reach its destiny throughthe appropriate development of all predispositions of its nature"(Anthropology 7, p. 329). Kantsanthropology "is not merely adescriptive account of humanculture.Rather, his aim is to offer the speciesamoralmap that they can use to move toward theircollective destiny" (Louden 2000, p. 106; cf. Louden2 011, p. 76 f. ; L ouden 2014) . This is what distinguishes pragmatic from physiological anthropology." Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigationofwhat nature makes of the human being;pragmatic, the investigationofwhat he as afree-acting beingmakes of himself,orcan and should make of himself" (Anthropology 7, p. 119). Thek ey teleological assumption is that thesep redispositions and germsa re potentials that could and should be developed -itiseach individuals task as "an animal endowed with the capacity of reason (animal rationabile)" to develop this potential and to make oneself "a rational animal"(Anthropology 7, p. 321;LP9,p.445).
In his writings on anthropology and the philosophy of history, Kant has offered asketch of the development of the capacities and potentials of the human species. Theemphasis is on external behaviour, the rise of culture,and the regulation of external spheres of action, culminating in the regulative idea of acosmopolitan condition, "as the womb in which all original predispositions of the human species will be developed" (Idea 8, p. 28). In the following paragraphs,Iwill try to outline Kants sketch of the history of the church (Kirchengeschichte)-astory difficult to tell since it refers to inner moral dispositions and pure religious faith (neither of which can be observed;cf. Religion 6, p. 108). YetIclaim that Kantdid tell this story in the Religion,assuming as his starting point the concept of pure moral faith accessible to any humanbeing since all of us share the samemoral predisposition (see above). This is Kants anthropological starting point;the historical origins of this moral faith are not specified. In "Conjectural beginning of human history" (1786), the emphasis is on the development of reason,f reedom and morality from their "original predisposition in the nature of the human being" (8, p. 109), not on the unfolding of moral faith. Thee arly humans are worried about their future and death, but console themselves with the thought that they will "live on in their posterity" (8, p. 113). Religious issues are absent from Kants "pleasure trip", although he usesasacred text (thebook of Genesis) as his "map" (8, p. 109).Y et we can safely assume that for Kant,m anifest religiousp ractice started witha n aberration, in agreement with Kantsclaim -echoingRousseau -that the history of naturalp redispositions "beginsf rom good, for that is the work of God", whereas the history of religious practice started "from evil, for it is the work of the human being"(8, p. 115). Thehistoryofreligious practice starts with "the servile worshipo fG od (or gods)" (Religion 6, p. 176), based on human awarenesso f being helpless.This worship turned into "temple service" when it became public, which in turn transformedi tself into "ecclesiastical service"o nce the "moral culture" of humans developed further (ibid.). All this is nothing but whatK ant calls paganism, which "consists in passing off the externals (non-essentials) of religion as essential" (Conflict7 ,p .5 0). Externals are "merely statutoryt eachings" (ibid.);a tt he beginning, articles of faith and dogmat riumph over "pure religions faith"w hich "locates the essence of all divine worship in the human beingsmorality" (Conflict 7, p. 49) .
Though he does occasionally mentionnon-Western systems of faith (e.g.End 8, p. 335 f. ;Religion6,p.176), Kants historicalaccount almost exclusively focuses on Judaism and Christianity. Judaism, Kant claims, is "not ar eligion at all" but based on ap olitical rather than religious constitution with an emphasis on "external observance" rather than moral dispositions.I te mphasises worldly punishments and rewardsrather than "faith in afuturelife", and aconstitution that has resulted in an exclusive,u ncosmopolitan community (Religion6 ,p p. 125-127). It has been hampered by "the garb of the ancient cult, whichnow serves no purpose and even suppresses any true religious attitude" (Conflict7,p.53).
Judaism is the negative foil to makeC hristianity shine. One of its distinct advantages over the Jewish faith is,a ccording to Kant, its cosmopolitan nature, namelythe attempt to found auniversal church open to "the whole human race" (Religion 6, p. 127). In other words,itis"areligion valid for the world and not for one single people" (ibid.;see also 6, p. 157). When dealing with Christianity,Kant drew aline between the teachingsofChrist according to the New Te stament and what later generations of theologians and church leadersm ade out of them -a web of beliefs Kant summarized under the concept of ecclesiastical faith. Kant openly expressed his admiration for Christ, and referredt oC hristianity as "supposedly destined to be the world religion" (End 8, p. 339;cf. Religion 6, p. 131). In his publications,K ant repeatedly asserted that only the Bible and Christianity properly understood corresponded with puremorality and practical knowledge "drawn from the human beings own soul". Forthat very reason they "acquired so extensive asphere of efficacy and achieved such lasting influenceon the world" (Conflict7 ,p .58; see also Religion 6, p. 131 and 162;KdU 5, p. 472 note;Conflict 7, p. 9). So Kant also offered his explanation why Christianity was destined to become worldr eligion:i ti st he religion where the inner principle, namelythe principle of morality,triumphs over externalstatutes and dogma. All we have to do is simply "make room" for this moralreligion. "This teachingisthe true religious doctrine,based on the criticism of practical reason, that works with divine power on the hearts of all human beings toward theirf undamental improvement and unites them in one universal(though invisible) church" (Conflict 7, p. 59 ). Christ -usually referredtoasthe "teacher of the Gospel" (e.g.Religion 6, p. 128, 158;End 8, p. 338) -did not wantblind obediencetohis own will,but appealed as "a friend of humanity" "to the hearts of his fellow human beings on behalf of their own well-understood will, i. e. of the way they would of themselves voluntarily act if they examinedt hemselves properly" (End 8, p. 338). In other words,Jesus above all turned peoples attention to their own moral predisposition and practical reason, and introduced "a pure religious faith" (Religion 6, p. 131; cf.127, p. 159 f.).
In this way Kant arguesfor atotal matchbetween the teachings of Christ and the voice of practical reason. Kant leaves it open "whether the first Christians […] truly improved morally" (Religion6 ,p .1 30). Once Christianity developeda "learned public",however, it soon dilutedthe idea of apure moral religion, and began to include"acertain admixture of paganism" (Conflict 7, p. 50;Religion 6, p. 167), that is,itadded externals as essential to the faith. This led to the rise of mysticism and orthodoxy," the view that belief in dogma",h istorical belief and observing church practices were sufficient or the core of religion (Conflict7,p.60, 54, 80;R eligion 6, p. 130;C onflict 7, p. 36). Eventually the ecclesiastics undermined their very purpose,n amely cultivating religion:t hey focusedo nt he externals and neglected the essential, namely "impressing on their parishes moral principles" and cultivating a"moral disposition" (Conflict 7, p. 80) . Kant reads the historyofChristianity from the early church to his present, the eighteenth century, as ahistory of distortion, aberration and perversion, where the proper hierarchy (moral faith should come first)was turned upside down (cf.Religion 6, p. 165 and pp.170-175).
In his narrative,Kant jumps from the Reformation to the eighteenth century. It is perhaps significant that there is no special place for Martin Luther.Kant dismisses the "so-called religious struggles" of modern European history as mere "squabbles over ecclesiastical faiths". They do not deserve the name "religious" in as trict sense sincer eligion is am atter of the inner life and "dependso nm oral dispositions" (Religion 6, p. 108). Va rious ecclesiastical faithsdistinguish themselves in terms of "style"b ut not in terms of principle (Religion6,p .1 76). The processofreform has reached aclimax in the Age of Enlightenment, and Kant does not specify when it started.Infact, he does not have to do that, since"the seed of the true religious faith" (Religion 6, p. 131) has been presentf rom the beginning, as part of the human condition (see above).The goal of reform is clear: ecclesiastical faith should be "rectified" by pure moral faith (Conflict7 ,p .5 1; Religion 6, p. 132 f. ,176). Thepresent situation is unacceptable:"Theclergyman holds the layperson strictly and constantly in his immaturity.The people have no voice and no judgment in regard to the path they have to take to the kingdom of heaven" (Anthropology 7, p. 209). Immaturity has to be replaced by maturity.The basis of this reform is the processo fE nlightenment, where "the community is susceptible and inclined to give ahearing […] to apractical reason which has been illuminated" by religious doctrines (End 8, p. 336) as well as by "the representation" of the moral law (ibid.,338). Intellectualsincludingclerics working in a public sphere makep ublic use of their reason and should enjoy unrestricted freedomtopropose ideas how to reform ecclesiastical faiths (Religion 6, p. 132 f. ; Enlightenment 8, pp.36-38;End 8, p. 336). Religious reform is part and parcel of the processofEnlightenment, whichinturn is anecessary condition of the human speciesm oving towards its vocation. "People gradually work their way out of barbarism of their own accord if only one does not intentionally contrive to keep them in it" (Enlightenment 8, p. 41).
In the Starke manuscript of 1790-1791, where Kant reflects upon akey problem of human history,namely the transition from culture or civilization (revolving arounds kilfulness and prudence) to moralization, and calls "the crossing-over [Übergang] " from the former to the latter "the mostd ifficult condition of the human race", he refers to people like himself "who are working on the unity of religion, on the step of this crossing-over from civilization to moralization. Inner religion standsi nn ow for the position of legal constraint" (quotedi nL ouden 2000, p. 42). Apparently Kant saw the writings of Rousseau, Basedow,Spalding and other like-minded religious reformers (including himself) as attempts to recover the moral and rational kernel of Christianity and to educate the younger generationi nt he spirit of ar eformed Christian faith, thusc ontributingt ot he promotion of the ethicalc ommonwealth and the comingk ingdom of God on earth. Likethese and other Enlightenmentphilosophers or theologians,Kant held that most historical faiths were -i na ll likelihood -j ust manifestations of one universal moral or naturalreligion (LP 9, p. 496;Peace 8, p. 367 note;Religion 6, p. 153 f.), which again underlined "the unity of humankind as that of afamily" (LP 9, p. 494).
Ihave argued above that Kants narrative of the coming of the invisible church supports my interpretation that Kant favoured acomprehensiveversion. "Church history" can reflectively be interpreted as the move in worldhistory -understood by some Enlightenmentthinkersinanew way as acollective singular (cf. Sommer 2006, pp.252, pp.351-369 ) -fromexternal statutesand dogmatothe inner moral disposition, the religion of the heart -which is invisible just like the church itself. As aconsequence,and in contrast to previous theologies,Kants narrativeand his religious cosmopolitanism do not have to insisto nc lear dividingl ines between believers and non-believers.
Kant summarizes his theological chiliasm in 1793:"Such is […] the work of the good principle -unnoticedtohumaneye yet constantly advancing -inerecting a power and akingdom for itself within the humanrace,inthe form of acommunity according to the laws of virtue that proclaims the victoryover evil and, under its dominion, assures the world of an eternal peace" (Religion 6, p. 124). This is not theoretical knowledge,but aregulative principle,practical faith and hope,namely that eventuallythe germ of the good principle will be developed among people across the globe.T he millenniuma tt he end of historyi sn ot simply as ymbolic period of time,b ut perpetual peace,b ased not on coercive laws (as in the philosophyofhistory)but on non-coercive moral laws.The human race would have reachedits vocation.
Kant could have stopped here,a tt he end of the exposition of his religious cosmopolitanism. This would have been typical of at rendo fE nlightenment philosophy,afavourable attitude towardsnatural religion and its core,morality (see Religion 6, p. 170a nd 175), but scepticism or open hostility towards "historicalf aiths" and organized religion, for instance Roman Catholicism (seef or instance Rousseau 1997, p. 146 f.) . Kant is offbeat and provocative,especially for a secularized age.Hecomplements his religious cosmopolitanism with aChristian cosmopolitanism. Kants allegiance to the Christian tradition is the surprising element, though it can also be foundi nm ost German writers of the Enlightenment like Spalding up to the 1780ies (seeSpalding 2006 , pp.202-204 and 217-219, Allison2009, pp.52-56, and Winter 2000 .
Kant clearly favoured and privilegedamodernized form of Christianity, something which is usually eyed with suspicion by contemporary commentators, since it soundss ou n-cosmopolitana nd rather Eurocentric( see for instance Louden2000, pp.130-132; McCarthy 1986, pp.89-91 and 101; Sala 2004, p. 230) . Significantly, Kant was familiar with Moses Mendelsohns Jerusalem oder über die religiöse Machtu nd Judentum (1783) and even praised the authors attempt to interpret the Jewish faith as compatible with natural religion in his private correspondence(see the lettertoMendelssohn, August 16 1783, 10, p. 347), but he denied this possibility in the published writings,most notably the Religion (cf.6, pp.125-128).
Apology:the Christian churchesand religious formation
In this section, Iamgoing to discuss two relatedKantian claims.T he first one is that religious formation (as developed in the previoussection) has to be rooted, that is,has to take as its starting point an ecclesiastical faith with its statutory laws. Iargue that this claim is plausible.Kants second claim is that only the Christian churches can offert his startingp oint. Id on ot find this argument completely convincing.
Thewhole speciesreaches its vocation by promoting the highest moral good in the world. This social goal takes the organizationalf orm of the ethicalc ommonwealth.I nt he preliminary notes to the essay "Über den Gemeinspruch" (published in 1793), Kant equates the "cosmopolitanu nion (Welt-Bürgerliche Einheit)" with the French revolutionaries ideal of fraternitØ (Verbrüderung;23, p. 139). Theconcept used for aglobal union through contract is "federalist"; "cosmopolitan" is the word for amoral union without acontract, presumably based on the cultivated morality of its members (23, p. 140).A ccordingt ot he Religion (1793), the ethical commonwealth is promoted by religiousc ommunities,p rovided that they reform themselves following the principles of purer ational morality and moral faith and that they avoid the pitfalls of counterfeit service. "The idea of apeople of God cannot be realized (by human organization) except (nicht anders als) in the form of achurch" (Religion6,p.100, my emphasis). Kant tries to mediate the ap riori idea of an ethical community with the human condition and historicald evelopments,a nd consequently interprets the visible churches -apparently he has Christian churches in mind -assymbols or archetypes of the idea of an invisible church.They are steps towards the realization of the universal,invisible cosmopolitan church, the KingdomofGod (cf.Religion6, p. 101 and 122).
Kants arguments for an institutional frameworkh ave been summarized by Allen Wood (see for the following Wood 2011, pp.137-140) .The starting point is Kantsjuxtaposition of pure rational faith and its emphasis on good life-conduct with historical faiths and their statutory laws;yet Kant immediately attempts to mediate the two.Pure rational faith cannot be perceived or apprehended directly unlessitismediated by ecclesiastical faiths. Believersmust therefore work within these faiths in their search for the only true religion -t hat of practicalr eason. These institutions are flawed (since they have been createdbyhuman beings),but they are the only means at disposal to fight against radicalevil and to promote the idea of am oral commonwealth. There is ap arallel with the political realm (cf. Wood 2011, p. 138 f.), Kant assumes that states wereoriginallydespotic andunjust. Political history can reflectively be interpretedasthe struggle of humansto transform these unjust institutions into republican governments corresponding with the idea of right. Thesame holdstrue for international relations.They start with aggression, expansion, colonialism, and aflawed theory of the law of nations (see for instance Peace 8, p. 355 and p. 358 f.). It is the task of humans,i nt heir attempt to promote the highest political good, to reform these relationswith the help of theirown reason. Needlesstosay that Kant saw himself as participating in this cosmopolitan enterprise.T he philosophyo fh istory "with ac osmopolitan intent" is the sophisticated, critical reflection upon state and international right and its potential of reform (cf.Idea 8, .
Thea nalogy between ecclesiastical faiths and imperfect states is incomplete. These faiths,e ven if they take the form favoured by Kant, are mere stepping stones,w hereas the republic approachingt he ideal constitution seems like a proper end of politics. On the otherhand, Kant seemedtohold that the citizens participationi narepublican government guaranteeing and fosteringt he public use of reasonw ould in all likelihoodc ultivate their moral predispositions and cognitive capacities.I np articular,ar epublicanf orm of government might help citizenstotrain the three maximsoftheenlarged way of thinking, namely thinking for oneself,thinkingconsistently,and assuming the perspective of others (cf.KdU 5, pp.294-296, Moran 2012, p. 213 f. , Munzel 1999, pp.175-181 and Cavallar 2015, pp.133-146) . In this way,the republican government, even though it is an end in itself,i sa tt he same timeastepping stone that mightp romote morality,c ritical thinking,and acritically disciplined,moral religion.
It urn now to Kants arguments for the Christian churches.A sm entioned above,Ido not find them completely convincing. Istart with areconstructionof Kants arguments.
First, only the Christianchurches acknowledge the humanpropensity to evil. According to Kant, the problem of ancient pagan philosophy,ofEpicureans and Stoics,i st hat, unlike Christianity, they do not have ac onception of radical evil (Religion 6, . This is the conscious and deliberate subordination of the moral law under adisposition (Gesinnung)that gives the "subjective principle of self-love" priority (Religion, 6, p. 36). Interpreters have not failed to emphasize that Kants doctrine of evil is close to,a nd shares some similarities with, the Christian doctrine of peccatum originarium,ororiginalsin, though there are also profound differences (cf.Religion 6, p. 31;see for instance Horn2011, p. 43 and 64 and Forschner 2011, pp.83-89) . Thed octrine is essential for moral disciplinemoral trainingo re thicala scetics -a nd thus also for any successful moral formation (Bildung)s ince it reminds educators that they cannot start with natural innocence "but must ratherbegin from the presupposition of adepravity of our power of choice in adopting maxims" (Religion6,p .51). Educators can reasonably assume suitablepredispositions and a"germ of goodness" (ibid.,p.45);but they should also acknowledge the wills tendency to subordinate the incentives stimulating morality or the rational commands of duty to the incentives of selflove (cf.Religion6,pp. 32-39).
Second, Kant interprets Christianity as amoral religion at its core.His primary witnessisJesusChrist,who is credited for introducing pure morality (cf.Religion 6, p. 160) and "pure religious faith",w hich has the potential to become" au niversal world-religion"(ibid.,p.131;cf. Conflict 7, p. 58 f. and refl. 1396, 15, p. 608) . The"world religion" which Kant favoursand which is universal since it is valid for every humanbeing (Religion 6, p. 157) is the rational core of the Christian religion. "The teacher of the Gospel manifested the Kingdom of God on earth to his disciples only fromits glorious,edifying,and moral side,namely in terms of the merit of being citizens of adivinestate;and he instructed them as to what they had to do,not only that they attain to it themselves,but that they be united in it with others of like mind, and if possible with the whole human race" (Religion 6, p. 134). One finds familiar Kantian elements,the emphasis on universal moralityand moral action ("what they had to do"),the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship in its moral version (it is not am atter of politics or right, but of religion rooted in morality), and the claim that like the idea of republicanism,t his religious commonwealth should be global in reach. Then ovel and unusuale lement is the centralrole of Christ and of Christianity.
Third, Kant holdst hat moral as well as proper religious education is only possible in the visible Christian churches.When introducing the idea of the ethical commonwealth, Kant frequently compares it with ajuridical community,for instance as tate (Religion6 , . This comparison highlights what Stroud calls the "problem of force": "The situationc oncerning moral improvement seems relatively bleak, since nothing actively can be done" (Stroud2005, p. 332). However, as outlined in the second section, Kant does have asophisticatedtheory of moraleducation, his ethicaldidactics. Theadvantage of the Christian churches is that they do have an insight into the propensity of the human will, they know the enemy of virtue,the do not downplay or ignore radicalevil. The"thesis of innate evil" is essential for moral discipline,that is,moral training or ethical ascetics (cf. Religion 6, p. 51;see Koch 2003, pp.299-314 on Kants ascetics). Ethical ascetics is the third part of Kants moral education or formation (Bildung), the othert wo being moralinstruction(in turn dividedinto catechism, casuistry and the use of examples) and moral motivation.M oral instruction aimsa tp roviding moral knowledge;moral motivation tries to help the student to adopt theproperpure moral disposition;moral training aims at the capacity to followthe moral law and at virtue,since "between maximand deed there still is awide gap" (Religion 6, p. 47;see also Cavallar 2015, pp.117-132 and Munzel 2012) .
Kant developedhis theoryofmoral formation in the "doctrine of the method" of his major works of ethics (seef or instance KpV 5, pp.151-161). Since the primary task of the churches is to cultivate morality,their methods often overlap with those of moral formation. Kant inserts didactical advice in the Religion,for instance with the claim that arousing the "feeling of the sublimity of our moral vocation is especially praiseworthy as ameans of awakening moraldispositions" (Religion 6, p. 50). There is aparallelpassageinthe "doctrine of the method" of the second Critique (cf.K pV 5, p. 161). When Kant claimsi nt he Religion that moral formation in ah uman being has to start with "the transformation of his attitude of mind" (Religion 6, p. 48), am oral revolution or "change of heart" (ibid.,p .4 7), then he repeatsaf amiliar assertion of his ethicald idactics( cf. Anthropology 7, p. 294;L P9 ,p .4 80 f.). Otherp arallel passages concern the "example of good people" (Religion 6, p. 48 and below) .
Thedidactical tools of the Christian religious communities are diverse.T hey can be dividedinto two groups(see Stroud2005 and 2008) . Thefirst form of noncoercive measuresisrationalpersuasion and overlaps with the moral instruction of the ethicalw ritings.S cott Stroud claims that "a Kantian notiono fr hetoric, throughi ts use of morallyi mbued religious subject matter, is key means to instantiate conditions" that help to foster the ethical community,i nt he form of encouragement of the community members to cultivate their own moral predispositions,and respect for the moral law (Stroud 2005, p. 329) . Themethods employed are "vivid presentation" and the presentation and discussion of moral examples (ibid.,p.330). Kants position on the use of examples is quite complex (see Guyer 2012 for an introduction). Kant rejects them if they become artificial aids,go-carts (Gängelwagen)orleading-strings (Leitbänder)which block peoples efforts to think and judge for themselves (cf.K rV B1 73 f. ;L P9 ,p .4 75). Used properly in moral formation, however, examples can cultivate the "predisposition to the good" (Religion6,p.48; see also MM 6, p. 479);they can serve as proofthat morality is not an illusion, but "really possible" (MM 6, p. 480; see also KpV 5, p. 158) . Any possible example has to pass the test of purity first, it must be judged or "appraised in accordancew ith principles of morality,a st ow hether it is also worthyt os erve as an original example,t hat is,a sam odel;i tc an by no means authoritativelyprovidethe concept of morality" (Groundwork 4, p. 408). Ideally, examples bridgethe gap between life and the moral law we inherently know about and just have to become aware of.Kant interprets Jesus Christ as amoral example that can and should be emulated, "as proof that so pure and exalted am oral goodness can be practised and attained by us"(Religion 6, p. 64). Jesus is the idea of moral perfection, of humanity,and -again -aschemabywhich we make an idea comprehensible via analogy( cf.R eligion 6, p. 60, 65, 75 f. ,8 0, and 132;c f. Conflict 7, p. 59). One corollary is that Christ should not be turned into adeity standing beyond human frailty;t his would makeh im an idealb eyond human reach and emulation. Jesus has to be "totally human" (Religion 6, p. 64 f.). At any rate,t he "vivid presentation" and the presentation and discussion of morale xamples in church services,f or example with readings from the New Te stament, help to foster moral predispositions and respect for the moral law.
Thes econdf orm of non-coercive measuresu sed in Christianc hurches is rituals:"Singing praises,prayers,and going to church should only give the human being new strength,n ew couragef or improvement, or they should be the expression of ah eart inspired by the idea of duty.T hey are only preparations for good works,b ut not good workst hemselves,a nd one cannot please the highest being otherwise than by becoming abetter human being" (LP 9, p. 494;c f. Religion 6, p. 192 f.). Kantrepeats afamiliar thesis here,that religion should be based on morality (and not the otherw ay round), and that moral educationh as to precede religious instruction (cf.LP9,p.494 f. ;MM6,p.478;Religion 6, p. 154). YetKant never claimed that religious rituals should be replaced by moralaction; he concedes that they do serve an important function, namely preparing for morality and strengthening virtue,a nd thus they complement moral formation. Religious formations hould follow moral education. Performing rituals has a subordinate,but still legitimate role to play in the life of the moral person. They offer something that the morallaw itself cannotp rovide:w hen performed with the proper disposition, they may give "new strength, new courage".
Thechurches and their rituals have the function to strengthen the moral dispositionand rational faith, to avoid despairabout our own depravity and finitude, and to guardthe secrets of this rational faith, namely the "holy mysteries" in terms of the realization of the cosmopolitan Kingdom of God to come (cf.Religion 6, p. 138). Forp resent purposes,t he first and third mysteries are most relevant. The first one is that "of the call (Berufung)(of human beings to be citizens of an ethical state)"( Religion 6, p. 142). With our limited human understanding, we cannot solve the riddle of beingfree and at the same time created beingscalled by God. Thethird mystery is that of election (Erwählung); in asimilar vein, this mystery is impenetrable (cf.i bid.,p .1 43). Thei mportant thing to note is that for Kant, humans do not simply become members of the ethical commonwealth by respecting others or letting them pursue their ends (I see this as af requent contemporary interpretation;see for instance Moran 2012, p. 83) . Thecommitmentto morality is anecessary,but not sufficientcondition. In addition -and this is the religious dimension properly speaking -agents attemptingtobecome moral beings explicitlyu nderstand their envisioned good life-conduct as authentic religious service,a nd perceive themselves as possible citizens of the divine commonwealth. Individuals have ordained their morald isposition to this Kingdom. Communal rituals are an experience of the attempt to cultivate ones moraldisposition in acommunity (cf. Stroud 2008, p. 153) . At the end of the Religion,Kant discusses four forms of religious activities,namely prayer,church-going, baptism and rituals maintainingthe religious community such as the holy communion (cf. Religion 6, . Theu nderlying idea is that individuals in their visible churches come to understand themselves as "citizens in the Kingdom of God" or "in adivinestate" (Religion6, p.199; cf. ibid., p.195 note, 197) . Churchgoing, for instance,h as the purpose "to excite the moral incentives of each individual through an externalsolemnity which portrays the union of all human beings in the sharedd esire for the Kingdom of God" ( Religion 6, p. 197 note) . Again, the invisible is representedsymbolically.Again, the invisible church is cosmopolitan in the sense that the moral agent should not wish that anyone is excluded from this kind of community.
Kant is successful only in the first part, namely the argument for an institutional framework.Kants arguments for the Christian churches are more problematical. He holds that the biblical stories are "validand binding practically,for the whole world and at all times" so that anyone "can recognize his duty in it" (Religion 6, p. 83). However, Kant reaches this cosmopolitan conclusion only after he has interpreted these stories according to his hermeneuticalapproach (on Kants hermeneutics see Höffe 2011, pp.231-247 and Wood 2011, pp.142-145) . At times Kant displays ah ermeneutical openness,f or instance,w hen he claims that his interpretation is perhapsnot "the only meaningaccordingtowhich we can derive something edifying from atext" (Religion 6, p. 43 note;cf. 84 note).Inaddition, he believesthat ecclesiastical faithsother than the Christianone have also tended to read their holy books with the pure moralfaith as their supreme interpreter (cf. Religion 6, p. 110 f.). However,Kant does not pursue this thought any further;and in otherp assages, he bluntly asserts that only the Christianr eligion meets the standards of "moral religion" (cf.Religion 6, p. 52). This claim is fairly dubious,to put it mildly.P hilosophers like Karl Jaspers have argued that sages in various civilizations during the so-called Axial Age (roughly 800 to 200 BC) developed forms of faith such as Taoism or Buddhism going beyond the old paganisms and emphasizing the importance of the moralorinner dimension, and that this was a global phenomenon not restricted to Western civilization (see Jaspers 1953 and Armstrong 2006) . In addition, thereare passages where Kant could be interpreted as havingdeveloped an understanding of membership in the invisible church that is comprehensive, not exclusive (see section3). If "church history"can reflectively be interpretedasthe move in world history from external statutes and dogma to the inner moral disposition, to the religion of the heart, then Kants religious cosmopolitanism does not have to insist on clear dividing lines between believers and non-believers.
ForKant, ecclesiastical faiths (andespecially Christianity) are historically indispensable in the evolution of the moralpredispositions and religious convictions of the humanspecies,and in the process of cultivating acritically disciplined moral religion (see sections 3a nd 4). However, eventuallyt hese ecclesiastical faiths could be dispensed with, since they are mere stepping stones. This is not the case with moral religion. Given certainanthropological and epistemological features of human beings,such as our frailty,being susceptible to temptation, our scepticism concerning the validity of the moral law or its feasibility,and an inclination to give way to despair,m oral( cosmopolitan) faithi sanecessary supplement to strengthen virtue and our commitment to morality.
In the history of religion, apology is definedasthe attempt "to lend credibility to ones own convictions […] in the face of other […] worldviews" (Nüchtern 2007) .Kantsinterpretation of Christianity has apologetic elements. This is one side of the coin. Theo ther one is expressedi nt he following question:I st here anything recognizably Christian that survives Kants critique of so-called historical faiths in the lightofhis own moralreligion? Theissue goes beyond the scope of this essay. It requires an analysis of the concept of "Christianity" as it was understood during Kants time,aninvestigation into the apologetic literature of the age,i nto Kants bible hermeneutics, and into what he understood as the essence or core of the Christian faith (for ah istoricali ntroductions ee Beutel 2009).
Conclusion:Between tentativeand ExpansiveCentrism
Critics might point out that Kants religious cosmopolitanism is apparently cosmopolitan in avery limited way,ormight not even deservethis label. Astandard criticismi st hat it amountst on othing but ar efined," enlightened" version of expansive centrism,where ones own reinterpreted tradition -namely,W estern European Christianity -isthe only legitimate standard and, sincei tisdeclared "universally valid", is destined to,orshould become,aglobal project.
Kants centrism is partly tentative or transitory,t hat is,a ssumes that in principle,different perspectives are possible,and is open towardsdifferent positions (see Wimmer2 004, pp.15-17, 54-58 for ad efinition of centrism).T he starting point is ones own philosophical endeavours,b ut these are exposedt or ational scrutinyjust like other endeavoursofasimilar kind.Inthis qualified sense Kant offers ac osmopolitan philosophy of religion. The locus classicus of expansive centrism is the New Te stament, where Christtells his disciples:" [G] o and make disciples of all nations,baptizingthem in the nameofthe Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything Ihave commanded you" (Matthew 28, (19) (20) . Kant construesthe expansivecentrism of Christianity as mere tentative centrism, and his basis is an interpretation of Christianity as a cosmopolitan-minded, universalmoral religion (see for instance Religion 6, p. 127 and 134). Othercosmopolitanelements are Kants belief in abenevolentGod who loves the whole human race (Religion6 ,p .6 5n ote) and his assertiont hat only pure religious faith, and not any ecclesiastical faith, is truly universal sincei ti s based on the universal principles of common human reasona nd in principle intelligibletoany rational being. Furthermore,there is his claim that people all over the world are Christians "in potential"p rovided that they have acquired a moral disposition,promote the highest good, and have anatural religion;Kants example is Socrates( cf.23, p. 440) . Finally,t here is his political argument that world peacec an be promoted if historicalf aiths,i ncluding Christianity,w hich have traditionally been sources of disagreement, sects,c onflict, bloodshed, and war (cf.Religion 6, p. 131;C onflict 7, p. 50), reform themselvest owards ap ure rational faith.
Ih ave argued in this essay that Kants religious cosmopolitanism is Janusfaced. There is atensionbetween arational understandingofmoral faith and an embedded approach that culminates in an apology of Christianity.T herefore, Kants philosophy of religion is cosmopolitan in aq ualified sense because it combines ar einterpreted, rationalized Christianityw ith the formal capacity to think for oneselfincommunity with others and with an understanding of morality that claimstobeuniversal. Kants religious cosmopolitanism is both dynamic and embedded. It is rootedi ni ts own tradition, but also ready to go beyond the confines of any particular historical faith. Kants religious cosmopolitanism can thus be interpretedassituated between tentative and expansivecentrism.
